Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

Kent W. Holman and Alfred G. Kessler, dba Golden
Spike Reality and Construction v. Blair W.
Sorenson and Marjean Sorenson : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Prince, Yeates, Ward, and Geldzahler; Attorney for Appellants.
Joel M. Allred; Attorney for Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Kent W. Holman and Alfred G. Kessler, dba Golden Spike Reality and Construction v. Blair W. Sorenson and Marjean
Sorenson, No. 14305.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1394

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
45.9
•S9
DOCKET NO.

UTAH SUPREME COURT
BRIEF

s>

RBCBJVKD
t A W Ltiiii.-...-^

COURT OF THE
UTAH

!~JUi\il97?
eRlGHM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

J, Rcuka Gark Uw SchooS

KENT W. HOLMAN and
ALFRED G. KESSLER, dba
GOLDEN SPIKE REALTY
and CONSTRUCTION,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 14305
vs.
BLAIR W. SORENSON and
MARJEAN SORENSON,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

Appeal from judgment of the District court
of the Third judicial District
in and for Salt Lake county, State of Utah
Honorable james s. Sawaya, judge

JOEL M. ALLRED, Esq.
345 South state street
Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondents
PRINCE, YEAT£^ WARD & GELDZAHLER
J. Rand HiradM:-, Esq.
455 South Thi:cd East
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellants

FILED
JUN - 9 1976
Gferk, Supreme Court, Utah

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

1-A

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1-A

ARGUMENT

8

POINT I.

POINT II.

THE COURT'S FINDING OF MUTUAL
BREACH WAS AN EFFORT TO AVOID
THE IMPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF'S
ATTORNEY FEES
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED ESTABLISHED
CONTRACT PRINCIPLES TO THE COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES

POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS
SHOULD BE UPHELD ON APPEAL
POINT IV.

8

13
16

THIS COURT'S DECISION SHOULD
RESOLVE, FINALLY AND FOREVER,
THE ISSUES BETWEEN THE PARTIES . . . . 18

CONCLUSION

19
*************

AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases
Anvil Min. Co. v_. Humble, 153 U.S. 540, 38 L ed
814, 14 S. Ct 876
12
Barrett y_. vickers, 24 Ut 2d 334, 471 p.2d 157 . . . . 17
Bewick v. Mecham, 26 Cal 2d 92, 156 P.2d 757,
157 ALR 1277

11

Buckman v. Hill Military Academy, inc., 190 Or. 194,
223 P. 2d 172

12

Casey v. Nelson Brothers construction company, 24 Utah
2d 14, 465 P. 2d 179 (1970)

17

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
Columbus R. Power and L G y_. Columbus, 249 U.S. 399,
63 L ed 669, 39 S. Ct 349, 6 ALR 1648

11

Devas v. Noble, 13 Ut 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290 (1962)

20

. .

Ford v. Norton, 32 NM 518, 260 P. 411

11

Flynn v_. Schocker construction co. 23 ut 2d 140, 459
P.2d 433

17

Heywood v. Ogden Motor Car Co., 71 Utah 417, 266
P. 1040, 62 ALR 1232

11

imperial F_. ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U.S. 452,
38 L ed 231, 14 S. Ct 379

12

Jacob and Youngs inc. v. Kent, 230 NY 239, 129 NE 89,
23 ALR 1429

16

Keller y_. Deseret Mortuary company, 23 ut 2d 1,
455 P. 2d 197

13, 14, 15

Lynch v. McDonald, 12 ut 2d 427, 367 P.2d 464

....

12, 13

Martin v. Martin, 29 Ut 2d 413, 510 p.2d 1102

....

17

Nakdimen v. Baker (C A 8 Ark) 111 F. 2d 778, cert den.
311 U.S. 665, 85 L ed 427, 61 S. Ct 22

12

New v. New, 148 Cal App 2d 37 2, 306 P.2d 987

11

Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Ut 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 . . .

18

Porters v. Traders ins. Co., 164 NY 504, 58 NE 641 . . 10
Porto Rico v. Title Guaranty and S_. C£., 227 W.S.
382, 57 L ed 561, 33 S. Ct 362

10

Shell v. Schmidt, 164 Cal App 2d 330, 330 P.2d 817 . . 16
Terry y_. united states Fidelity and G_. C£., 196
Wash 206, 82 P.2d 532, 119 ALR 1276

11

University Club v. Beakin, 265 ill 257, 106 NE 790 . . 10
Williams v. Yellow pine B O X and Lumber Co., 126 wash.
380, 218 P. 245

11

William B. Hughes produce Co. v_. Pulley, 47 Utah
544, 155 P. 337

11

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Winger v. Gem State Mutual of Utah, 22 ut 2d 132,
449 P. 2d 982

17

**********
I

TEXTS CITED
j> corbin on contracts, sec. 1094

14

Restatement of Law, Contracts, 578, Sec. 346,
Comments (g) and (h)

14

Williston contracts, 3d ed 812 et seg

12

Williston on Contracts, vol 11, 1363, p. 340

15

5 Williston on contracts 3824, Sec. 1363

14

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

KENT W. HOLMAN and
ALFRED G. KESSLER, dba
GOLDEN SPIKE REALTY
and CONSTRUCTION,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 14305
vs.
BLAIR W. SORENSON and
MARJEAN SORENSON,
Defendants.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs, Kent w. Holman and Alfred G. Kessler,
Contractors doing business as Golden Spike Realty and
Construction, filed suit against the Appellants' for the
foreclosure of a mechanics lien; for damages for the breach
of a construction contract and for attorneys fees, court
costs and punitive damages.

The Defendants counterclaimed

asserting breach of contract.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District court found that the Appellants'
had breached the contract and awarded plaintiffs the sum

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of $7,321.00. The Court also found that the plaintiffs
breached the contract and held that each of the parties
should bear their own attorney's fees and costs.

The court

foreclosed the lien of the plaintiffs and one asserted by
Fashion cabinets Manufacturing, inc., which had priority,
and stayed execution of the judgment for six months.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiffs ask the court to affirm the judgment of the Trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Alfred G. Kessler and Kent w. Holman, plaintiffs
below, operated as a partnership under the name of Golden
Spike Realty and construction.

Mr. Blair sorenson, who

wished to construct a fourplex on Green Street in Salt Lake
City, approached Mr. Kessler and later Mr. Holman, who were
building such a unit, and solicited a bid for his project
on which he then had no plans and specifications.

(R. 4,5)

The plans and specifications were drawn by
William Hargreaves, who acted as both architect and engineer.
The prospective contractor, did not assist with the preparation of the plans.

(R. 6)

The parties, after some dis-

cussion, executed an Earnest Money contract, Exhibit p-1,
which was later supplemented by additional terms, Exhibit
p-2.

The parties later signed a construction Agreement,

Exhibit P-3, and a supplement to General Building contract,
Exhibit P-4.
1-A
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The plaintiffs, in signing the contract documents,
relied on the original plans and specifications drawn by the
Defendant^ architect, to which a basement was, at the Defendants request, later added.

(R. 15)

Early on, a subcontractor arranged for by Plaintiffs was to demolish the premises for the salvage value,
without additional charge.

(R. 16)

Before demolition

commenced, the plaintiff, Mr. Holman, found several women
removing items from the premises with the approval of the
Defendant, Mrs. sorenson.

The women were instructed by the

Contractor to take nothing more from the site than they had
already taken.

As a consequence of those directions,

Mr. Holman received a letter from p. Briton McConkie, the
first of three attorneys to have represented the Defendants
in these proceedings, directing Golden Spike to cease construction under the "intended" Construction contract because
the Defendant, Marjean sorenson, and not her husband, Blair
Sorenson, was the "owner" of the property, and because the
Contract was consummated "against her will."

Mrs. Sorenson,

the attorney said, was not "in sympathy with the proposed
construction" and although she acknowledged that her husband
had an interest in the property in the event of her death,
would not "permit" the project to be built.

(Exhibit P-6)

The letter was received only 10 days after the
Defendant, Blair sorenson, had signed the construction
Agreement, Exhibit P-3, representing that he was the "OWNER"
and that he had "acquired" and held the property at 2305
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Green Street in Salt Lake City in "FEE SIMPLE.11
Recital 1)

(See

The letter threatened litigation if demolition

continued.
The Contractor, to facilitate the construction,
permitted the unanticipated removal of the furnace and of
other fixtures by the Defendants.

There being, then, no

profit in the salvage, the subcontractor for demolition
refused to perform.
for cash.

Another subcontractor was then hired

(R. 20)
Later, in violation of the terms of the contract,

the Defendants failed to give the notice required of the
approval and recording of the bank loan, of the finalization
of the plans and of the approval for construction by the
municipal authorities.

(R. 21)

it fell to the plaintiffs

to obtain the required permits, the terms of the Contract
notwithstanding.

The Defendants plans, prepared by the

agent, Mr. Hargreaves, were not initially acceptable under
the Code and their approval was not obtained for nearly two
months after the construction Agreement was signed.

(R. 24)

Construction did not commence until July 27, 1973.
During excavation, the plaintiffs struck water.
The plans, from which the contractor was to build, had specified that the soil conditions were clay.

The responsibility

for the unanticipated problem was, contractually, that of
the Defendants.

The project was temporarily abandoned to

see if the condition would correct itself.

(R. 25)

It did

not and the plaintiffs recommendation that the Defendants
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

permanently abandon the basement, which had not been a part
of the original plans, was ignored.

(R. 27,28)

New and

revised plans were devised to implement the construction of
a basement in the face of the water table problem and
included, among other things, retaining walls, a plan for
raising the foundation above grade and directions to waterproof the concrete.

(R. 28,29)

On September 1, 1973, the parties defined the
responsibilities for the work required by the changed plans
in a Letter Agreement, Exhibit P-8.

(R. 33)

The plaintiffs

agreed to undertake certain of the tasks (see especially
paragraphs 3 and 4) for specified prices. Mr. sorenson,
who was to assume responsibility for part of the construction under the arrangement between the parties, agreed to
comply with the city ordinances respecting the construction
of a building above grade.

(R. 34)

He was, among other

things, to build the retaining walls and, Mr. Holman said,
to provide for the backfill.
The plaintiffs, who were to be paid for the work
as it was completed, performed the tasks required by the
September 1 arrangement (Exhibit P-8), but were never paid
for the materials furnished or for their services.

(R. 35,

36,37)
There were a multitude of other problems during
construction.

The Defendants plot plan, Mr. Hargreaves plan,

was inaccurate and the setback was inadequate.

The plain-

tiffs, because of the error in the plans, were obliged by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the City to remove footings already poured, dig new ones,
move the building back and to shorten the mansard roof.
(R. 37,38,39)

Mr. Sorenson piled railroad ties at the site

for the construction of the retaining walls.

They proved to

be an impediment to the delivery of materials and to construction.

The railroad ties were not permitted by the

Building code and the idea to use the ties, instead of concrete, was subsequently abandoned.

Mr. sorenson!s subcon-

tractor misplaced the footings on the concrete retaining
walls, misplaced and left out necessary rebar and poured
concrete in cold and freezing weather.

(R. 41)

As a result

of poor workmanship, the wall cracked when the area was backfilled.

Dead men were required to stabilize the faulty con-

struction.

(R. 42)

The Defendant Sorenson who denied any

responsibility to backfill the retaining walls did not
complete his construction of those walls until January of
1974, some eight months after the parties signed the original
Construction Agreement.

(R. 45,46)

The City issued a stop

order in connection with the stairs in the front of the fourplex, Mr. sorenson1s responsibility.

(R. 47,48)

A variance

was required for which additional plans had to be drawn.
The requirement for a variance involved the necessity for a
public hearing and a meeting with the Board of Adjustment and
occasioned delays on the job.
Other problems, attributable to Mr. sorenson1s
heavy handed interference in every phase of the project,
concerned the payment of the contractor's funds.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The

Defendants did not deposit funds equivalent to the contract
price in the loan-in-process account at American savings
as permitted by the contract and agreed by the parties,
(paragraph 3, Exhibit p-4)
by $6,000.00.

(R. 49,50)

The Defendants deposit was short
Failure to make such a deposit

resulted in diminished draws to the contractor, when the
progress payments were made, (R. 51,52) which problem was
further exacerbated by the lenders right to deduct costs,
(R. 52) such as construction interest, for which Mr. Sorenson
was responsible.

(R. 53)

The second draw was withheld by

Mr. Sorenson because, the Defendants claimed, there were
pitmarks on the basement floor caused by leakage from a
rainstorm.

The amount of the draw, $8,000.00, exceeded by

forty times the cost of the repairs for the floor, approximately $200.00, and the draw withheld did not concern concrete at all, but rather a payment for the lumber and materials required to bring the building to the square.

(R. 54)

The Defendants delayed construction by their conduct (R. 60,61,62,63,64,65) and the court so found.
ing 7, R. 525)

(Find-

The Defendant sorenson "many" times called

the plaintiff, Holman, and kept him on the phone till midnight.

(R. 58)

The Defendant after initiating discussions

with the State contractor's office, refused to submit his
complaints to arbitration, something to which the plaintiffs
agreed.

(R. 67)

The Defendant sorenson dealt directly with

the plaintiffs subcontractors without plaintiffs approval
(R. 75) and ordered changes in the quality and nature of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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finished materials required by the plans without advance
consultation•

(R. 78)

It is clear from the record that the plaintiffs
bid was a very good one, lower than that of the other
bidders (R. 74) and providing for a very narrow margin of
profit.

(R. 73)

it became apparent, as the project pro-

gressed, that there would be no profit for the plaintiffs
and the Trial court's award, if fully affirmed, will not
change the loss equation.
The Plaintiffs, who estimated that they were only
a day and a half from the completion of their responsibilities, were dismissed from the job on May 30, 1974 (R. 78)
by means of a letter from the Defendants second attorney,
Mr. Hollis S. Hunt, who subsequently handled the case at
trial.

At the time of the dismissal, the plaintiffs were on

the job hanging and adjusting doors.

(R. 80)

On August 26, 1974, the plaintiffs initiated a
lawsuit against the Defendants, who filed a counterclaim.
The plaintiffs testified as to their damages,
establishing the contract price, the amount paid and the
value of extras and credits.

The court found damages in the

amount of $7,321.00, awarding no costs or attorneys fees.
The Defendants moved for a clarification of the judgment
and later made a motion for a new trial.

The Defendants did

not set the latter motion for hearing, and did not appear
when the plaintiffs did so.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

The Defendant Sorenson then engaged the services
of Mr. Rand Hirschi, a third attorney, for purposes of the
appeal.
It is worth noting that the Defendants subpoenaed
sixteen witnesses to testify (Returns on service for fifteen
are in the record at 482-515), actually calling nine and dismissing a number of others.

The Plaintiffs testified

themselves, Mr. Kessler very briefly, and called only one
other witness.
ARGUMENT
POINT X
-THE COURT'S FINDING OF MUTUAL BREACH WAS AN EFFORT
TO AVOID THE IMPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY FEES.
Section 38-1-18 U.C.A. 1953 provides as follows:
"in any action brought to enforce any
lien under this chapter the successful
party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys fee, to be fixed by the court,
which shall be taxed as costs in the action."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Supplement to General Building contract,
Exhibit P-4, provided,
"in case of default in performance of
this contract, the defaulting party agrees to
pay all expense of enforcement, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.11
The Earnest Money, Exhibit P-l, also provided for
an attorney fee.
With these statutory and contractual provisions in
mind, the plaintiffs asserted at the trial that they were
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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entitled to attorney fees of $2,400*00 incurred prior to the
trial, and to $350,00 per day for the three to three and a
half days spent in court.

The figures were admitted by a

Stipulation of counsel found at pages 186 and 187 of the
record.
The Court did not wish to impose attorney fees on
top of the judgment and advised counsel, in chambers, in
connection with a discussion of the attorney fee provisions,
and before a ruling, that it might be inclined to a finding
of mutual breach, presumably to avoid what appeared to be
the mandatory language of the statute, 38-1-18 U.C.A.
Counsel on this appeal, Defendants third attorney, was not
privy to the discussion nor a participant at the trial.
The effect of a finding of mutual breach was the
avoidance of plaintiffs attorney fees, an advantage to the
Defendants,

such fees would have increased the judgment,

which, considering the circumstances, was minimal, by 50%.
The court said as much,

in its direction to Counsel, which

Appellant has included as Appendix "A" to the Brief, the
Court said,
"It is the Court's further opinion that
the plaintiffs have breached the contract
in the respects alleged by the Defendants,
however the above computation is inclusive
of the amounts to which they have been
damaged and to which they are entitled;
therefore plaintiff is entitled to judgment
for the above amount with no attorney fees
being awarded to either party, and each
party to bear its own costs.fl (Emphasis
supplied)
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The relationship of attorney fees to the finding
that the plaintiffs had breached, an afterthought, is
obvious.
Appellantsf appellate counsel seeks to turn the
finding of mutual breach into a theoretical dilemma with far
reaching implications.

The issue as to whether a contract

has been breached is ordinarily a question of fact for the
trier of facts if the evidence is conflicting or if different
reasonable inferences may be drawn.

See:

"Contract," section 355, p. 793, 794.

17 Amjur 2d,

it is also for the

trier of the facts, judge sawaya in this instance, to determine from the facts and circumstances whether the omission
of some act stipulated in the contract or a departure from
its terms is substantial, that is whether it is a matter
vital to the contract, material or essential, or merely an
omission or departure in an unimportant detail. See:
porters \f. Traders ins. Co. 164 NY 504, 58 NE 641, University
Club v. Beakin 265 111 257, 106 NE 790.
in this case, judge sawaya found a breach, which
conveniently nullified Respondents' attorney's fees and
costs, but not, the judge thought, the contractor's right to
damages arising from the Appellants' far more serious conduct.
Whereas a plaintiff cannot prevail in an action
for nonperformance of a contract if hre alone is responsible
for the nonperformance, Porto Rico v. Title Guaranty and s.
Co. 227 W.S. 382, 57 L ed 561, 33 S. Ct 362, William B.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Hughes Produce Co. v. Pulley 47 Utah 544, 155 P. 337, if the
impossibility of performance arises directly or even indirectly from the acts of the promisee, it is a sufficient excuse
for nonperformance.

This is upon the principle that he who

prevents a thing may not avail himself of the nonperformance
which he has occasioned.

Columbus R. power and L G v.

Columbus 249 U.S. 399, 63 L ed 669, 39 S. Ct 349, 6 ALR
1648, Bewick v. Mecham 26 Cal 2d 92, 156 P.2d 757, 157 ALR
—

_ _ _ _

{

1277, Ford v. Norton 32 NM 518, 260 p. 411 (recognizing
principle but finding it inapplicable), Williams v. Yellow
Pine B O X and Lumber Co. 126 wash 380, 218 P. 245. See:
ANNOTATION:

84 ALR 2d 65 12 (b).

Where the facts are in dispute, as they clearly
were, where different reasonable inferences could be drawn,
as they clearly could, judge sawaya sitting without a jury
was entitled to determine whether one had performed, Heywood v. Qgden Motor car Co. 71 Utah 417, 266 P. 1040, 62
ALR 1323, substantially or sufficiently, New v_. New 148 cal
App 2d 37 2, 306 P. 2d 987, or had failed to perform.

See:

Terry v. united States Fidelity and G. Co. 196 wash 206, 82
P. 2d 532, 119 ALR 1276.
The court concluded that the Defendants breached
the Contract from the very beginning, in that they,
11

interfered with demolition, denied
ownership of the property, caused variations
from the plans and specifications, made unauthorized substitutions, and despite repeated
and continued demands, failed to make progress payments in the time and manner specified,
failed and refused to pay for extras that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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had been commissioned, or for the balance
due under the contract, delayed the completion of construction, withheld percentages
from the payments which were in fact made
and ordered the plaintiffs, in violation and
breach of the parties contractual arrangement,
not to proceed with or complete the project."
(Finding 7, R. 525)
The plaintiffs failed to complete the project, the
Court found, in the time specified, and left, at the time of
their withdrawal, (they were, of course, dismissed) some
work to be completed. (Finding 9, R. 526)
The situation, with respect to the consequences
of the Trial court's finding that there was a mutual breach
and the implication of such a finding for the issue of
damages, is well covered by traditional contract principles.
As a rule, a party first guilty of a substantial or material
breach of contract cannot complain if the other party thereafter refuses to perform,

imperial £. ins. Co. v. coos

County 151 U.S. 452, 38 L ed 231, 14 S. Ct 379, Williston,
Contracts 3d

ed 812 et seg.

He can neither insist on per-

formance by the other party, Nakdimen v. Baker (C A 8 Ark)
111 F. 2d 778, cert den. 311 U.S. 665, 85 L ed 427, 61 S.
Ct 22, nor maintain an action against the other party for a
subsequent failure to perform.

Lynch v. McDonald 12 Utah

2d 427, 367 p. 2d 464. Where a contract is not performed,
the party who is guilty of the first breach is generally
the one upon whom rests all the liability for the nonperformance.

Anvil Min. Co. v;. Humble 153 U. S. 540, 38 L ed

814, 14 S. Ct 876, Buckman v. Hill Military Academy, inc.
190 or. 194, 223 P. 2d 172.
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in Lynch v_. McDonald, supra, this court accepted
the principle that the party who commits the first breach
cannot maintain an action against the other for a subsequent
failure to perform,

under the circumstances, the owner,

Mr. Sorenson, was not entitled to "Damages Measured By His
Cost to complete" the project, or to any damages.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED ESTABLISHED CONTRACT
PRINCIPLES TO THE COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES.
Plaintiffs Damage Recapitulation, Exhibit P-ll,
which was illustrative of Mr. Holman's testimony, was prepared according to principles enunciated in this court's
decision in the matter of Keller v. peseret Mortuary
Company 23 Ut 2d 1, 455 P. 2d 197.
Deseret Mortuary, like the present Appellants,
claimed at the trial that the plaintiff, Mr. Keller, had
breached the contract in that he had not completed the work
in time nor in a satisfactory or workmanlike manner.

The

Trial court found the issues for the plaintiff and awarded
damages.

This court, saying that there was "substantial,

reasonable and credible evidence" to support the Trial
judge's findings, chose not to overturn the court's decision
on grounds of delay or poor workmanship.
The Appellants, in Keller, argued that the plaintiffs recovery should be limited to the reasonable value of
the work performed and the materials furnished.

This court

noted that there was a "definite contract" upon which the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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claim of the plaintiff was based, and that the assessment
of damages by the Trial Court was "consistent with the general principle which underlies the ascertainment of damages
for breach of contract:

that the non-breaching party

should receive an award which will put him in as good position as he would have been in had there been no breach."
Citing 5 williston on contracts, 3824, Sec. 1363; 1 Restatement of Law, contracts, 578, Sec. 346, comments (g) and (h);
5 corbin on contracts, Sec. 1094. The court found no error
in an award of damages based upon the total amount promised

for the project less the reasonable cost of completing

it.
The formula used by the plaintiffs in this case,
as illustrated by Exhibit P-ll, which showed damages slightly in excess of $7,300.00, and the formula used by the Trial
judge and approved on appeal in the Keller case are virtually
identical,

p-ll was prepared with the pacific Reporter open

to the Keller case,

it includes extras, which in this in-

stance were required to ascertain the total contract price,
and offsets and contract credits to the Appellants, which
were, in view of the relationship between the parties, required to adjust the total contract price,

otherwise, the

formula applied looked to the contract and to the amount
paid by the Defendants, the balance if the job had been
completed and the reasonable cost of completion, the product
being the measure of plaintiffs damage.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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There can be no doubt that the Trial judge also
relied on the Keller principle in computing damages.

The

item entitled "Credits due Defendants" on the court's
July 9 letter to counsel, Appendix "A" to Appellants Brief,
included, the court found, costs of completion.

(Finding 9,

R. 526)
Reference to the Keller case at page 198 and the
Court's letter to counsel (R., between 515 and 516), and to
Finding 9, indicates the Court followed the standard
enunciated in Keller.
The Trial court concluded that the Defendants
"breached the contract," "caused the delay in construction"
alleged by the plaintiffs and caused damage, the amount of
which was then specified.

(July 9 letter to counsel,

Appendix "A" to Appellants Brief)

The unspecified breach

of the plaintiffs, invoked to avoid the imposition of
attorney's fees and costs, did not operate to avoid the
award of damages or to remove the application of the principles established by this court in the Keller case to
determine the amount of such damages.

The fact that the

Court below found a breach by the plaintiffs should, under
the circumstances, alter nothing,

professor williston,

quoted by this Court in Keller as authority for the proposition that the non-breaching party may recover damages
equivalent to the fruits of his bargain, would not quibble
over a contractors "minor deviation from the required performance."

vol 11, Williston on contracts, 1363, p. 340,
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See also: Jacob and Youngs inc. v. Kent 230 NY 239, 129 NE
89, 23 ALR 1429, Shell v. Schmidt 164 Cal App 2d 330, 330
P. 2d 817.
judge sawaya, whose duty it was to determine whether
a breach was material, a simple omission or an unimportant
detail, did not find that the plaintiffs1 breach precluded
the plaintiffs' claim for damages measured by Keller
principles.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS SHOULD BE UPHELD ON
APPEAL.
The Brief of the Appellants' is filled with references to the Trial court's Findings on the issues of damage.
It re-examines, in confusing detail, the constituent factual
elements of the Findings and challenges their accuracy,

it

is of little value, on appeal, for this tribunal to re-try
the case on damages or to become involved in the morass of
detail which complicated the case from its inception.

The

facts on damages were controverted and disputed, conflictory
and susceptible to varying inferences.

The court made its

findings based on the testimony of the witnesses and the
proofs which were submitted,

counsel submits that the

veracity of the Defendants can be quickly ascertained, even
from the cold record, by the most cursory examination of the
Accounting summary, Appendix "C" to Appellants Brief.

(which

is not an Exhibit and which is improperly included in the
Brief)

The document is inflated and totally unreliable.
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The

Court's utter rejection of the summary, given the testimony
and the circumstances, was entirely inevitable.
The Respondents' find it unhelpful to be drawn,
on appeal, into a minute and detailed discussion of the elements of the damage award.

The evidence is in the Record,

the Abstract and in the Damage Recapitulation, Exhibit P-ll,
which was modified to some degree by the court, and by the
testimony, both up and down.
Where there is a dispute in the evidence, this
Court has repeatedly supported the findings of the Trial
Court, assuming that
"....the Trial court believed those
aspects of the evidence, and drew the inferences which could fairly and reasonably
be drawn therefrom, which tend to support
the findings and judgment...." Casey v;.
Nelson Brothers construction company 24
Utah 2d 14, 465 P. 2d 173 (1970). See
also: Winger v_. Gem State Mutual of Utah
• 22 Ut 2d 132, 449 P. 2d 982.
If upon the review of the record, there is a
reasonable basis in the evidence to support the court's
findings, they will, of course, not be disturbed. Barrett v^
1
Vickers 24 Ut 2d 334, 471 P. 2d 157.
There is, on this
record, competent testimony supporting all of the court's
critical factual findings.

The Trial court made its find-

1#

An action for breach of contract is an action at law,
rather than equity. Flynn v^ Schocker construction Co. 23
Ut 2d 140, 459 P. 2d 433. in an action at law, the Appellate court does not reverse on issues of fact where the
Trial Court's findings are supported by the evidence or the
absence of it. Martin v. Martin 29 Ut 2d 413, 510 P. 2d 1102.
-17-
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ings some of which are cumulations of elements from the
testimony of both Plaintiffs and Defendants, after hearing
disputed and contradictory evidence from the parties*

This

Court has frequently indicated that where competent evidence
supports the fact finder's conclusions, it cannot "substitute" its judgment for that of the Trial court, even if it
disagrees with the findings,

pitcher v^. Lauritzen 18 ut 2d

368, 423 P. 2d 491.
POINT IV
THIS COURT'S DECISION SHOULD RESOLVE, FINALLY
AND FOREVER, THE ISSUES BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
The decision in this case should, finally and
forever, resolve all matters in controversy between the
parties.

The Trial court, and judge Stewart M. Hanson, jr.,

earlier in the record, forever barred lien claims of other
potential claimants as against the property in question,
excluding only the claims of the plaintiffs and those of
Fashion cabinets Manufacturing, inc.

The Plaintiffs, who

have been delayed in receiving payment for their work for
several years, should, as a result of this decision, be
fully free from further problems with these Defendants.
This decision, and the decision of the Trial court, should
be res judicata on all issues between these parties as a
result of the agreement for the construction of a fourplex
at 2305 Green Street in Salt Lake City, Utah.
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*

CONCLUSION
The Trial court did not award the plaintiffs
their attorney fees or costs, nor did its computation include the full face value of the extras asserted by the
Plaintiffs,

in the face of some orchestrated confusion,

concerning damages, the court kept its own counsel making,
apparently, some deductions and additions for which there
was and is no precise itemization.

Balancing the claims of

the litigants, evidenced by a confusing record, the court
arrived at its figures, independently, after the trial concluded.

The court recorded counsel's final arguments which,

while unreported, contained the somewhat modified figures
which remained at the conclusion of all the evidence,

it

found the extras to amount to $3,900.00, a reduction of over
$1,500.00 from the amount the Plaintiffs initially claimed.
Where factual findings are confusing and disputed, technically based, it is difficult to match the advantaged position of the lower court.

The Trial Court was

able to gauge, first hand, the credibility of the parties
and the problems raised by vastly contradictory facts.
The findings of the determiner of the facts, because of his close proximity to the witnesses and the trial
and because he is the exclusive judge of the credibility

-19-
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2
of witnesses and of the "weight to be given evidence",
should be upheld on this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
JOEL M. ALLRED
Attorney for Respondents

2m

pevas v. Noble 13 Ut 2d 133, 369 P. 2d 290 (1962)
certiorari denied — s. Ct 37, 371 U.S. 821, 9 L ed 61,
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